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Over the past decade, concern over potential global warming has focused attention on the
emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, and there is an active debate concerning the
desirability of reducing emissions. At the heart of this debate is the future path of both
greenhouse gas emissions and economic development among the nations. We use global panel
data to estimate the relationship between per capita income and carbon dioxide emissions, and
then use the estimated trajectories to forecast global emissions of CO2.
The analysis yields four major results. First, the evidence suggests a diminishing marginal
propensity to emit (MPE) CO2 as economies develop; a result masked in analyses that rely on
cross-section data alone. Second, despite the diminishing MPE, our forecasts indicate that global
emissions of CO2 will continue to grow at an annual rate of 1.8 percent. Third, continued growth
stems from the fact that economic and population growth will be most rapid in the lower-income
nations that have the highest MPE. For this reason, there will be an inevitable tension between
policies to control greenhouse gas emissions and those toward the global distribution of income.
Finally, our sensitivity analyses suggest that the pace of economic development does not
dramatically alter the future annual or cumulative flow of CO2 emissions.
Douglas Holtz-Eakin Thomas M. Selden
Metropolitan Studies Program Metropolitan Studies Program
400 Maxwell flail 400 Maxwell Hall
Syracuse University Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY 13244-1090 Syracuse, NY 13244-1090
(315) 443-9049 (315) 443-9049
and NOER1. INTRODUCTION
Over thepastdecade, concern over potential global warming has focused attention on
theemissionsof greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. There is an active debate concerning
thedesirabilityofreducing emissions,the shape of which has become quite familiar. On the
one hand are proposals to limit, perhaps sharply, the emission of greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere in the near term. Proponents of dramatic action argue that the potential for
catastrophic consequences is large, and that the persistence of carbon in the atmosphere
necessitates prompt reductions. Their reading of the evidence suggests that there has been
substantial and on-going change in the composition of the earth's atmosphere since the start
of the Industrial Revolution, and that economic growth in countries at all levels of
development appears likely to exacerbate the flow of emissions into the atmosphere.
Opponents of such policies point out that there is little hard evidence concerning the
impact of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions on the global climate. Even if one accepts
the evidence on overall emissions, isolating the anthropogenic portion of global change
requires a completely-specified model of the "general circulation" process. Opponents of fast
action emphasize that the predictions of existing models vary greatly (see, for example,
Schelling [1992] and Solow [1991]), indicating that our scientific grasp of the issues is
incomplete. Moreover, efforts to control or reduce greenhouse gas emissions may reduce
economic growth, thus placing a disproportionate burden on lower-income nations. This line
of reasoning often leads to a "no regrets" approach, favoring policies in the near term that
have benefits independent of the ultimate seriousness of global climate changes (see, for
example, Nordhaus [1992] and Shah and Larsen [1992]).
Our purpose is not to enter this debate. Instead, we emphasize that at its heart is the
future path of both greenhouse gas emissions and economic development among the nations.
—1—Baseline forecasts of economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions are a crucial component
of global climate models, and thus of benefit-cost assessments of policies toward global
climate change. There are many possible approaches to developing such forecasts. At one
extreme, one might simply extrapolate emissions at historic growth rates. The main problem
with such an approach is that it precludes any behavioral response to changing economic or
atmospheric conditions. Indeed, the historic rate of emissions has hardly been constant
through time. At the other end of the spectrum, one could parameterize a fully-specified
general equilibrium model and use the period-by-period equilibria to track out a forecast over
the desired horizon. The difficulty of such an approach lies in the enormous informational
burden it places on researchers.
In this paper, we adopt an intermediate approach, estimating the reduced-form
relationship between per capita income and emissions, and then forecasting aggregate
emissions based on scenarios for income and population growth. In contrast to naive
extrapolation, our approach embodies the historic interrelationships among trajectories for
economic development, population growth, and emissions. Moreover, in contrast to structural
models it is relatively parsimonious. Our estimated relationship between emissions and
income permits us to explore not only the path of aggregate emissions, but also the
distribution of emissions among nations without the need for a priori information on
numerous parameter values. In this way it permits us to develop detailed information on the
emissions-economic growth link across the globe. Our approach carries a cost as well:
reduced forms are not well-suited for policy analysis. Therefore, we restrict our attention to
the characteristics of the emissions baseline.
The relationship between pollution and economic development is the subject of a
small, but rapidly growing literature. Recent evidence in Grossman and Krueger [1991] and
-2-Selden and Song [1992] indicates that there is an "inverted-U" shape for the relationship
between per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the levels of four important types of
air pollution: suspended particulates, sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon monoxide
(see also Shafik and Bandyopadhyay [1992]). Hettige, Lucas, and Wheeler [1992] fmd
similar results using an index of the sectoral composition of industry weighted by the pounds
of toxic materials released in each sector. To understand how inverted-U relationships might
arise, note that each of these pollutants is characterized by significant health and
environmental effects within the emitting country, and relatively low abatement costs. Thus,
the inverted-U shape is consistent with a scenario in which industrial development initially
leads to greater raw emissions of these pollutants, but net emissions eventually decline as the
increase in income associated with further development raises the demand for health and
environmental quality.
This literature raises the possibility of a comparable relationship between greenhouse
gases and economic growth. If so, and if peak levels of pollution occur at low enough levels,
it raises the tantalizing possibility that instead of there being a trade-off between greenhouse
gas emissions and economic growth, faster growth could serve as part of the solution to the
worldwide emissions dilemma. From an a priori perspective, there seem to be reasons both
in favor and against the possibility of an eventual decline in emissions. On the one hand,
introspection suggests important differences between greenhouse gases and the pollutants
studied earlier. The effects of greenhouse gases are less restricted to local areas. Their
global nature reduces the incentive to reduce or abate emissions unilaterally. Further, many
of these pollutants are substantially more costly to abate, exacerbating the free-rider problem
among countries. These reasons argue against a tendency for greenhouse gas emissions to
-3-decline at higher per capita incomes, instead suggesting that they will rise monotonically with
incon te.
On the other hand, greenhouse gases are often produced jointly with oilier pollutants.
Thus, emissions of greenhouse gases may fall as a byproduct of other abatement efforts. For
example, efforts to improve automobile fuel efficiency may have as their primary goal
unproved urban air quality, but they would simultaneously reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Similarly, as economies develop, changes in the pattern of final demands toward increased
consumption of services may have as an indirect consequence reduced fossil fuel intensity.
These possibilities argue in favor of the possibility that emissions may ultimately stop rising,
or even fall, as economies develop.
Thus, the character of the link between economic growth and greenhouse gas
emissions is fundamentally an empirical issue. This paper investigates the income-emissions
relationship for one important greenhouse gas: carbon dioxide (C02). We exploit a rich
panel of country-specific data for the years 1951-1986 to estimate the link between GDP per
capita and emissions. As in most applications, access to panel data permits a richer
econometric analysis, which, in this instance, leads to substantially different results than
obtained using cross-sectional analysis.1 For example, we find a diminishing marginal
propensity to emit (MPE) CO2 as economies develop, a result that does not arise in studies
using cross-section data.
Partly as a result of the diminishing MPE, we forecast annual emissions growth that
averages 1.8 percent annually until 2025, compared with 3.2 percent between 1955 and 1985.
Ourforecasts are in many cases very close to the baseline forecasts obtained from the leading
structural models (Nordhaus and Yohe [1983]; Maxine and Richels [1992]; and Reilly ci'a!.
[1987]).In tins respect, our research provides independent confirmation of those studies.
-4-However, our results suggest several new aspects to the analysis of greenhouse gas
emissions. First, our sensitivity analysis suggests that variations in the rate of economic
growth do not lead to dramatic changes in CO2 emissions. For example, a cumulative decline
in GDP of 11 percent between 1990 and 2025 would yield only a four percent to six percent
decline in cumulative CO2 emissions. Second, our forecast emphasizes the changing global
distribution of CO2 emissions, and thus highlights the tension between policies toward CO2
emissions and the global distribution of income. Most of the world's population is
concentrated in countries for which incomes, population, and emissions are simultaneously
increasing at the fastest rates. Rapid emissions growth among these nations tends to offset
the slowing growth of emissions in wealthier nations,
The organization of the remainder is as follows. In the next section, we outline the
empirical task, describe briefly the data brought to bear on the question, and describe our
results. Section 3 contains forecasts of carbon dioxide emissions based on our estimates. The
final section summarizes our findings and their implications.
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
2.1Specification
The empirical goal is to estimate a relationship of the form:
=fO'h)+
1, (I)
where c1, denotes per capita emissions of carbon dioxide, v, denotes per capita GDP, i is a
country index, risa year index, and c, is a stochastic error term. A number of issues arise
immediately concerning this reduced-form specification. Perhaps the most fundamental is the
exclusion from equation (1) of explanatory variables other than per capita GDP. It is
important in this regard to distinguish between excluded variables that are endogenous
-5-consequences of economic growth and those that represent exogenous differences. Examples
of the former include the composition of output and consumption, regulations and taxes
influencing fossil fuel consumption, and evolving patterns of urbanization and sub-
urbanization. The essence of our approach is that such factors shouldbeomitted from this
simple model, as our objective is to assess both the direct and indirect consequences of
growth.
Of course, there are also likely to be exogenous, country-specific factors that affect
emissions. For instance, climate, geography, resource endowments, and land areavary widely
among countries, and will likely be correlated with emissions. Factors of this type will likely
cause the error terms in (I) to be correlated across all periods for each country, and pooled
time-series and cross-section estimates that ignore this correlation will be inefficient.
Moreover, if these omitted variables are correlated with per capita ODP, then cross-section
estimates of (1) will yield biased and inconsistent results (Mundlak [1978], Ilsiao[1986]).
For instance, many of the wealthiest countries in our sample are located inregions with
relatively higher heating needs. The resulting positive correlation betweeny, and the
"country effect" would impart an upward bias to the emissions-income relationship estimated
from a cross-section. Following standard practice, we exploit thelong panel of data available
by including fixed, country-specific effects in our estimation.
Similarly, there are likely to be exogenous factors shared by all countries in a given
period, but which vary across time. One important example is worldenergy prices, which
exert an influence on carbon fuel consumption and CO2 emissionscommon to all countries.
We control for this feature of the data by the inclusion ofyear-specific intercepts in each of
our equations. At the same time, this technique should control as well for suchglobal
features as macroeconomic fluctuations and technological trends.
-6-Another featureof equation (I) is that it links carbon dioxide emissions to
contemporaneously-produced GDP. On an a priori basis, we can think of little justification
for an explicitly dynamic relationship. Our instincts notwithstanding, however, our empirical
analysis investigates the role of lagged values of c, and ye,,andserial correlation in Er
Themain focus of our analysis is an emissions function that is quadratic in levels:
=[3 + I31y,++y +f+ (2)
(where the f and y, are the fixed country and year effects discussed above), or quadratic in the
natural logarithms of c11 and )'j,:
Inc=a0+a1(my) +;(mny12+• f.+c. (3)
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we refer to the specification in (2) as "levels" and that
in (3) as "logs."
The unabashedly empirical spirit of the investigation dictates that we guard against
mistakes in specification and estimation. Thus, in what follows we pay particular attention to:
Order of the PolynomiaLEquations (2) and (3) are second-order polynomials in the
level and logarithm of y,,respectively.Is the omission of third --orhigher --orderterms
unnecessarily restrictive? Put differently, does the curvature of the quadratic dictate the
nature of our results? Below, we examine the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative
specifications of the polynomial.
Serial Correlation.Given lags in adjustment to changes in income or other
economic shocks, it is entirely plausible that there is serial correlation in the C;rWhile
correlation among the residuals may not affect the consistency of our coefficient estimates,
adjustments for serial correlation will increase their efficiency. We examine the estimated
residuals for equations (2) and (3), and implement a generalized least squares approach to
correct for any serial correlation that we detect.
-7-Simultaneity Bias-One might conjecture that the direction of causality runs from
emissions (or the underlying fossil fuel use) to production as well, resulting in a correlation
between Y; and E1,Onescenario that generates simultaneity is when policies to control
emissions create a feedback from CO2 emissions to output. If above-average emission rates
induce policymakers to implement controls that have the effect of scaling back production,a
correlation between E,andy would result. While no widespread CO2 emissions-control
policies were in effect during our sample period, other fuel-efficiency policies may work in
this way as well. More generally, one might envision a wide variety of factors that could
affect fossil fuel use and thereby affect income. If so, standard fixed-effect estimators of the
coefficients in (2) and (3) wifi be inconsistent. To check for simultaneity bias,we employ a
modification of the instrumental variables estimator proposed by Holtz-Ealthi,Newey, and
Rosen [1988] (FINR). In this approach, current and lagged values ofy, and y are used as
instrumental variables in the estimation of equations (2) and (3). Under theassumption that
contemporaneous values of the right-hand-side variables are orthogonal to the error term, the
estimates will be consistent and efficient. Simultaneity bias, however, would manifest itself
as a violation of the orthogonality assumption, and the HNR techniquegenerates a chi-square
statistic to test this hypothesis.
Dynamics.As noted earlier, our specification contains no lagged values ofc,or
leading to the potential for misspecification. Note, however, that in these circumstances the
excluded lagged variables are effectively grouped with theerror term in our equation. By
construction, then, the error term in the misspecified equation will be correlated withpast
values of the dependent and independent variables. As in thecase of simultaneity bias, this
circumstance will generate violations of the orthogonalit-y conditions of thetype that the HNR
technique is designed to detect, and we employ it for thispurpose below.
-8-2.2Data Sources
The CO2 emissions data for this study were provided by the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL) [1992]. The data include emissions from aggregate fossil fuel
consumption and cement manufacture. ORNL has constructed the cement emissions data
from cement manufacturing data compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Mines.2 The data on fossil
fuel emissions are constructed by applying CO2 emissions coefficients to the United Nations
fossil fuel consumption data series, which controls for changes in the form of fuel, imports
and exports of fuel, and changes in fuel stocks (ORNL [1989])?
Measuring carbon dioxide emissions in this way omits the indirect consumption of the
fossil fuels embodied in a country's net imports.1 While such discrepancies are possible,
there is reason to believe that they are not large. Poterba [1992] presents evidence that in the
United States the fossil fuel content of imported goods in 1985 contributed less than 12
percent of U.S. fossil fuel related emissions. The netimportcomponent must surely be even
less. Thus, while trade-adjusted fossil fuel consumption estimates would be preferable, it
seems unlikely that percentages of emissions due to net exports vary enough over time for
this to be an important source of misspecification.
The income and population data used in this study are drawn from the Penn Mark V
World Tables in Summers and lieston [1991]. In particular, the income measure we use is
the RGDPCHserieson real per capita GDP. An advantage of this series is it uses a common
approach to measuring prices and a common unit of currency, so that real comparisons can be
made among countries arid over time. One disadvantage is that our sample is limited to the
countries for which this series is available --theSummers and Heston series includes multiple
observations for only 131 of the 197 countries and territories in the ORNL sample.
-9-Moreover, income data is available for a broad range of countries only through 1986, which
we therefore take as the last year of our sample.
We excludeKuwait -- whichis an outlier in all dimensions --andobtain an uneven
panel of data on 130 countries for the years 1951 to 1986. There is data for all years for 108
countries.5 The sample contains 73.7 percent, on average, of global CO2 emissions due to
fossil fuels consumption (net of gas flaring) and cement manufacturing. Apart from
emissions due to land use change, our analysis therefore embodies the predominant sources of
CO2 emissions. Summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis are presented in
Table 1 for the year 1985.
2.3Estimation Results
We begin by estimating equations (2) and (3), controlling for fixed year-specific and
country-specific effects. Examination of the estimated residuals shows substantial first-order
serial correlation, suggesting that the residuals follow the process:
C. =PE;r_j +
Inwhat follows, we correct each equation for serial correlation by estimating p in equation
(4) and using the result, ,toquasi-difference (2) and (3)•6 Using these corrected versions
of the equations, we obtain the estimation results presented in Table 2.
We next test for the existence of the country fixed effects. Not surprisingly, the
hypothesis that all countries shaxe the same intercept is rejected by a wide margin. Test
statistics for each specification are shown in Table 2.
Finally, for completeness we test the hypothesis that all years in the sample have a
common intercept. The test statistics (reported in the last row of the table) indicate that the
data reject this constraint.
-10-Consider the estimates presented in column (1) of Table 2, showing the quadratic
emissions function when estimated in levels. Estimated emissions initially rise with per
capita GDP (as the linear term is positive), but eventually fall (as the quadratic tenn is
negative), with the turning point occurring at $35,428 per capita in 1986 U.S. dollars.
Qualitatively, then, the estimates are consistent with an inverted U-shape for the emissions-
output relationship. The log specification (shown in column (3)) yields qualitatively similar
results over the sample range of incomes; the MPE is positive, but declining. Here the
quadratic term is not statistically significantly different from zero, and the estimated turning
point occurs at a very high level of per capita income --above$8 million.
Taken at face value, the fmding that CO2 may eventually diminish as income rises is
somewhat reminiscent of estimated relationships in the literature on emissions and income:
suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide (Grossman and Krueger [1991]; Selden and Song
[1992]), carbon monoxide and the oxides of nitrogen (Selden and Song [1992]), and the toxic
intensity of industrial composition (Hettige, Lucas, and Wheeler [1992]). Unlike these other
pollutants, however, the turning points estimated herein rely on the out-of-sample properties
of our estimated functions. Within the sample, we observe only a stabilization of emissions,
at best.
An important issue is whether the quadratic specification is appropriate. It is
straightforward to rule out the presence of fourth-order terms in both equations as well as
linearity iii the levels equation. We retain the quadratic term in the logs model in part
because it is strongly significant in the higher-order equations and in part because we believe
that the nature of this modelling exercise argues against imposing monotonicity.
Less clear-cut is the choice between the quadratic and cubic models- Consider first
the cubic term in the levels model in Table 2 (column 2). While this term is statistically
-11-significantly different from zero, its quantitative impact is small --ithas very little impact on
the character of the regression. Turning to the cubic term in the logs model, it too
contributes little to the explanatory power of the regression and is not precisely estimated.
Although its confidence interval excludes zero at the ten percent level, it includes a range of
values thattranslateinto substantially different trajectories for emissions.
To gain a feeling for the estimates, we plot all four functional fonns in the two panels
of Figure 1, along with the actual levels, for two important emitters at opposite ends of the
global income distribution: the United States and China.7 All four curves share important
similarities. First, in all cases the MPE is a diminishing function of per capita income within
the range observed for the entire sample. Second, the shapes of the curves are all quite
similar within the ranges of the data for each country. Nevertheless, there are important
differences. Looking first at the cubic in levels curve, it has the unattractive out-of-sample
property that the MPE begins to rise once income exceeds the inflection point at $28,010 --
thoughin practice the cubic in levels and quadratic in levels curves yield virtually
indistinguishable global forecasts. Turning to the cubic in logs model, the downturn in
emissions beyond $13,594 of per capita income has a larger effect on our forecasts, especially
for upper-income countries in the outlying years. However, at a heuristic level we are
uncomfortable forecasting rapid declines in the emissions of upper-income countries based on
estimates with such wide confidence intervals.' Because the cubic curves have unattractive
out-of-sample properties, and because they contribute so little to the explanatory power of the
regressions, we focus our attention below on the quadratic models.
As noted at the outset, the use of panel data permits a richer econometric specification,
and our statistical tests reveal significant country effects. Controlling for country effects is
more than a statistical nicety: Figure 2 demonstrates that the inability to control for country
-12-effects leads to a very different view of (lie etnissions-GDP relationship. Panels A and B
display the estimated quadratic levels and logs functions for selected countries in our sample
(derived using the estimates in Table 2), and compares these with the saint functional fonns
estimated using cross-section data for 1986 alone? A Figure 2 makes transparent, the
country-specific effects serve to shift the C02-GDP locus in an important way. h a cross-
sectional analysis, this leads to an upward bias in the estimates of the slope, or
By improving our estimates of the MPE, the use of appropriate statistical techniques
leads to a different view of the distributional aspects of emissions. Using the cross-section,
the richest countries appear to have the greatest MPE; whereas the fixed effects estimates
suggest that the reverse is true. In this sense, controlling for fixed effects results in estimates
that appear more optimistic over the long-run than those obtained from cross-sectional
analysis. However, even the fixed-effects models have the capacity to generate high growth
rates for global emissions over the foreseeable future, because the most rapidly growing
economies also have the greatest MPE.
As noted earlier, one concern is that the estimated equations are subject to
inconsistency due either to simultaneity bias or to misspecification of the dynamic structure.
If so, all the coefficient estimates (including our first-stage estimates of p) are inconsistent.
Using the HNR testing procedure as a generic test of our specification, however, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality.'2 Our specification, while relatively
parsimonious, appears sufficiently rich to capture the CJDP-driven determination of carbon
dioxide emissions.
-13-3. EMISSION FORECASTS
In this section we use the estimated relationships to constmct forecasts of global
emissions over the period 1986-2100 due to fossil fuel consumption and cement
manufacturing. Given our approach, we feel that the forecasts are most useful over the "near
tenn" (i.e., over the next several decades). As discussed further below, over longer horizons
assumptions concerning trends in the emissions-GDP relationship ultimately dominate the
forecast. Over the shorter period, however, our forecasts reveal the interplay between the
likely pattern of global economic development and the growth and distribution of global CO2
emissions.
3.1Forecast Method
We begin by forecasting per capita GDP for each country in our sample. In
constricting these forecasts, our main objective is to provide a plausible scenario for growth
that incorporates the convergence in per capita GDP growth rates that has been observed by
many researchers.'3 To achieve this, we pool our data and estimate the following flexible
functional form:'4
ln(y,1 ) —ln(y.)=
a,),+a,InQ'.,) +a2{In(y,)J2+ t. (5)
The results of this regression are reported in Appendix A, and the resulting curve is graphed
in Figure 3. As Figure 3 demonstrates, we find a "take-off' to rapid growth, with the growth
rate of per capita GDP peaking at 1.76 percent when per capita GDP is approximately $6,900
(in 1986 U.s. dollars). Beyond that point, growth rates diminish smoothly, so that at $30,000
of per capita GDP we forecast annual per capita income growth of only 1.30percent. While
we view this as a plausible scenario for the evolution of per capita GDP, we also construct
-14-scenarios in which growth is more rapid and slower. In these, per capita GDP growth rates
are increased or decreased relative to the central case by 0.5 percentage points per annum.
Our population forecasts are taken from PopulationProjections,1992 -93 (World Bank
[forthcoming}). Like our per capita GDP forecasts, the population forecasts reflect
decelerating growth rates in response to economic development, with highest growth rates
typically found among the poorest countries. The "global" population growth rate (i.e.,
computed per annum for the countries in our sample) decelerates from 1.81 percent in 1986
to 1.58 percent in 2000, to 0.74 percent in 2050, and to 0.21 in 2100. Taken together, the per
capita GDP and population forecasts generate unifounly decelerating annual growth rates for
global GDP (again, computed for the countries in our sample). Starting in 1986, global GDP
growth slows from 2.78 percent per year to 2.62 percent in 2000, to 1.89 in 2050, and to 1.42
in 2100.
In deriving forecasts over such a long period, one must inevitably confront the nature
of the trends in the variables of interest. In our approach, this issue manifests itself as the
need to "forecast" the year-specific intercepts. Such an undertaking exceeds the scope of this
analysis. Instead, we construct our main forecasts by setting the year effect at its 1986 level,
and then examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative assumptions.
3.2Forecasts of Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Given the income and population forecasts, it is relatively straightforward to compute
aggregate emissions for the 130 countries in our forecasting san-pIe (using our country-
specific fixed effects estimates). Moreover, the ratio of emissions from these countries to
total global emissions has remained remarkably constant over the past three decades.'5 For
-15-this reason, we simpiy scale these forecasts up to the global totals using the 1986 ratio (71.8
percent) in order to facilitate comparisons with other forecasts.
The "Base Case" rows itt Table 3 present our forecasts of global carbon dioxide
emissions The unambiguous message is that despite the diminishing MPE, continued future
economic growth will cause rapid increases in aggregate CO2 emissions. To understand how
high emissions growth can arise, it is useful to decompose global emissions growth as
follows. Let C,c.1 n1, be the total emissions from country i in year t, where c1, is per capita
emissions and n, is population. If global emissions are denoted by C, E Ci,, then one can
easily derive the following identity:
£= f (6)
where T din(c17) I d.ln(y11) is the country-specific GDP elasticity of emissions, S;,C, / C,
is the country's share of global emissions, j'.,'y., is the country's per capita income growth
rate, and h.,/n, is the country's population growth rate. ('The superscript "."denotes
derivative with respect to time.) Given the skewed distribution of global income, a large
percentage of the world's population is located in economies experiencing the most rapid
rates of income and population growth. (Indeed, countries with per capita GDP below $6,900
are forecast to experience accelerating per capita GDP growth.) From our emissions-GDP
relationships, these countries also have the greatest emissions elasticities. As these countries'
shares of total emissions grow, the result is continued rapid global emissions growth. In sum,
while the inverted-U shape of the estimated emissions function gives hope that one could
eventually 'outgrow" the emissions problem, as a practical matter the next section ifiustrates
that this effect does not come into play in the foreseeable future.
-16-3.3Sensitivity Analysis
How sensitive are future CO2 emissions to economic growth? The remaining rows of
Tables 3 5110w the sensitivity of our forecasts to faster and slower rates of GDP growth.
Consider the line for "Faster Per Capita GDP Growth" in Table 3. To compute this, in each
year (and for each country) we add 0.005 to the per capita GDP growth rate predicted by
equation (5). Since the resulting higher level of GDP feeds back into future growth, this does
not translate directly into a 0.5 percentage point increase in economic growth. Under this
scenario, for example, world GDP is 21.1 percent higher in 2025, while cumulative ODP
between 1990 and 2025 is 13 percent higher. (Simulations for slower economic growth are
computed in a symmetric fashion.)
Not surprisingly, the results in Table 3 indicate that both our levels and log equations
forecast higher carbon dioxide emissions as a result of faster growth. Focusing for the
moment on the year 2025, the levels equation suggests that faster growth will raise CO2
emissions by roughly 11 percent. The log equation indicates a similar impact. It is clear that
more rapid growth does not "solve" the emissions problem. More rapid growth simply causes
emissions to rise, while slower growth causes emissions to fall. From a climatic perspective,
however, the annual flow of emissions is less important than the cumulative emissions into
the atmosphere. Table 4 looks at the impact from this perspective. Again focusing on 2025
as an example, the forecast indicates that cumulative emissions after 1990 will rise, relative to
the base case, by between four percent (in the log version) and six percent (in the levels
version).
The results for slower growth are comparable. Reducing the pace of economic growth
according by the method of our simulation lowers the flow of carbon dioxide emissions by
approximately nine percent in 2025 (Table 3), with a cumulative effect of between four and
-17-six percent lower CO2 by 2025 (Table 4). The output cost of such a change is that GDP is
17.6 percent lower in 2025, and the cumulative foregone output totals to 11.3 percent of the
baseline output between 1990 and 2025. Thus, while changes in the rate of per capita
economic growth as large as 0.5 percentage points have an effect on carbon dioxide
emissions, the effect seems relatively modest.
As another way to see this, consider the final column of Table 4. The entries in this
column, labelled T, indicate the year in which cumulative emissions reach the level in the
year 2050 under the baseline forecasts. (Thus, T is definitionally equal to 2050 for the
baseline forecasts.) As the table indicates, slower growth "defers" the accumulation of CO2
emissions by only a few years: five in the levels equation and four in the log version.
In addition to exploring the sensitivity of our forecasts to changes in the pace of
economic development, it is also of interest to explore alternative assumptions concerning the
evolution of the year-specific intercepts. As mentioned above, in our central forecasts we fix
the year effect at its estimated level in the last year of the sample. In doing so, we explicitly
rule out any effects associated with changes in fossil fuel prices or technological progress
(apart from those which are embodied in our GDP forecasts).
With regard to changes in fossil fuel prices, a general increase in fossil fuel prices due
to reserve depletion would restrain demand and clearly cause CO2 emissions to be lower than
we forecast. However, total fossil fuel reserves are large, even relative to the consumption
our model predicts.'6 Moreover, the fossil fuels that are likely to experience the sharpest
price increases (e.g., petroleum) also tend to have the lowest emissions per unit of energy.
Thus, prices might even evolve in a manner that causes an increase in emissions, rather than a
decline.
-18-With regard to technological change, it seems quite reasonable that some innovations
would take theformof increased energy efficiency, allowing a given level of global GDP to
occur at lower levels of emissions. However, technological breakthroughs can also take the
form of reducing the costs of extracting fossil fuels, or offering new ways to benefit from
their consumption. Thus, neither the magnitude, nor even the sign of such change can be
predicted with any confidence.
Given our a priori uncertainty concerning the impact of changes in prices and
technology on future emissions, it is useful to consider the sensitivity of our results to
alternative assumptions concerning the year effects. In particular, our strategy is to use our
estimates of the year-specific intercepts to gain an insight into the potential range of variation
one might expect in the future. One way to use this information is simply to compute the
trend implicit in the estimated year effects, thereby enabling one to extrapolate these
influences into the future. Perhaps not surprisingly, the estimated trend is sensitive to the
period used for estimation and typically has large standard errors.'7 Thus, we pursue two
alternative methods.
In the first, we gauge the impact of trend growth in the year effects. To do so, we
compute the standard deviation of the year effects, o. Next, we assume that the year effect
at the end of our forecast period (2100) is, alternatively, higher or lower by two standard
deviations (2 cr5). We "forecast" the intervening values for the year effects by assuming the
year effect equals its actual value in the first year, but rises linearly to 2 ci (or falls linearly
to —2cT8) by 2100. In the second sensitivity test, we use the same intercept in each year of
the forecasts, but we alternately replace the 1986 value with the minimum and maximum of
the estimated intercepts from the period 197086,1B
- 19-The results of these two approachesare presented in Tables 3 and4.Clearly, changes
in theyear effectsthat are reasonable from a historical perspective would have quantitatively
important implications forour forecasts.This is particularly true if thefull impact of the
shockis feltin the firstperiod of theforecast, asin our"UpwardShifi" and "Downward
Shift" scenarios. Nevertheless, in none of the cases is the pace of cumulativeemissions
dramatically affected (see the values of T in Table 4). That is, if one considers the
cumulative emissions as of 2050 in the baseline scenarios of both the levels and logs models,
note that these levels are always reached prior to 2064, even in the slowest scenarios, and no
earlier than 2040, even in the fastest scenarios.
Our tentative conclusion is that fuel price changes or technological innovations within
the historic range should not unduly affect the accumulation of CO2 that we forecast. Indeed,
this conclusion regarding fuel prices echoes findings by other researchers that CO2
accumulation can be slowed only by taxes that are large relative to historic fossil fuel prices
(e.g., Nordhaus and Yohe [1983, p.98]).
3.4Comparison with Other Forecasts
Figure 4 graphs our levels and log forecasts along with the baseline forecasts from
three well-known models: Nordhaus and Yohe [1983], Manne and Richels [1992]. and Reilly
ea?.[19871.19 All five forecasts present essentially the same picture. Given the very
different method that we use to construct these forecasts, we interpret our findings as offering
independent continuation of these more structural, yet in some sense less "data-driven,"
approaches. In contrast, forecasts based on naive extrapolation yield substantially higher
forecasts (Nordhaus and Ausabel [1983] survey this literature). We find it interesting that by
simply keeping track of the interactions between income, population, and emissions, it is
-20-possible to construct extrapolations that very nearly approximate the findings of the more
structural models, at much lower analytic cost.
3.5Changesinthe Global Distribution of CO, Emissions
Because our model embodies the historic development trajectory,wefeel our approach
offers particular insight into the distributional features of future CO2 emissions. The changing
shares of global CO2 emissions can be clearly seen in Figure 5, which shows the percentage
shares of total emissions that we forecast for the bottom two quintiles, the third and fourth
quintiles, and the top (fifth) quintile of the global income distribution.20 As the discussion
above suggests, the third and fourth quintiles constitute the main source of global emissions
growth in the early decades of the forecast, with the first and second quintiles playing a
growing role in the subsequent decades. While emissions growth rates are highest among the
poorest countries, theft initial shares are very small. As a result, theft contribution to overall
growth is low until the relatively distant future. This pattern is particularly evident in the
levels forecasts, where the rapidly diminishing MPE causes the top quintile's share of global
emissions to fall below that of the third and fourth quintiles.
We urge caution in interpreting these results. In particular, the results do not
necessarily imply that international efforts to reduce emissions should be targeted at slowing
emissions growth in the countries with the most rapid growth. Efficiency concerns demand
instead that reductions occur where the marginal abatement cost is lowest, while equity
concerns would suggest that the burden be borne disproportionally by those most able to pay.
Indeed, the results in Figures 5 raise a note of caution that any abatement mechanism linked
to contemporaneous emissions would likely impose disproportionate burdens on the
developing nations.
-21-4. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
In this paper we present estimates of the relationship between CO2 emissions and ODP
derived from panel data, and use these estimates to forecast global emissions. Our estimates
and forecasts yield four major results. First, the evidence suggests a diminishing marginal
propensity to emit CO2 as economies develop --aresult masked in analyses that rely on
cross-section data alone. Second, despite the diminishing MPE, our forecasts indicate that
global emissions of CO2 will continue to grow at an annual rate of 1.8 percent, comparable to
other leading forecasts of CO2. Third, the source of continued growth is the fact that
economic and population growth will be most rapid in the lower-income nations that have the
highest MPE. For this reason, there will be an inevitable tension between policies to control
greenhouse gas emissions and those toward the global distribution of income. Finally, our
sensitivity analyses suggest that the overall pace of economic development does not
dramatically alter the future annual or cumulative flow of CO2 emissions.
-22-Notes
1. See the World Development Report [1992] and the background paper for this repàrt by
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay [1992]
2. Cement-related emissions are approximately two percent of the total in each year.
3. Because gas flaring is an activity more closely associated with production of fuel than
its consumption, we have netted this out of our dependent variable. In any event, gas
flaring only represents approximately one percent of total emissions.
4. For instance, if country A consumes goods produced using fossil fuels in country B,
the CO2 emissions would be credited to country B. It would perhaps be preferable to
credit such emissions to country A, though this need not pose an undue problem for
our aggregate forecasts.
5. Because of changes in political boundaries one must reconcile a few inconsistencies
between the series on income and that for CO2. First, we add the CO2 emissions of
the Ryukyu Islands to Japan's total for the years prior to 1972 (the year that the
islands were incorporated into Japan). Second, we exclude East and West Pakistan
through 1971, but include Bangladesh and Pakistan separately after 1971. Third, we
combine the emissions of Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak, and Sabah prior to their
unification in 1969 (but we exclude from our sample the combined emissions reported
for Malaysia-Singapore prior to 1957). Fourth, we combine the emissions of Panama
(excluding the Canal Zone) with those of the Canal Zone. Fifth, we combine the
emissions of Tanganyika and Zanzibar prior to theft unification in 1969. Finally, we
concatenate the series for Zimbabwe and Rhodesia-Nyasaland.
6. The remaining autocorrelation among the residuals from the quasi-differenced model is
negligible, suggesting that this is the appropriate correction.
7. To construct these figures, we have used the mean of the year effects estimates for the
years during which data was available for use in the estimation. Triangles denote
(approximately) duplicate values. Note that the scales in the two figures differ.
8. For instance, increasing the point estimate for ; by its standard deviation results in a
a turning point of nearly $21,000.
9. An example of such cross-sectional results can be found in the World Development
Report [19921. Also, the background paper for that report, by Shafik and
Bandyopadhyay [1992], presents pooled time series and cross-section results for the
ORNL data.
10.We chose 1986 for purposes of exposition alone. The substantive points are not
sensitive to the year chosen.
11.Indeed, close examination of Figure 2-B shows that the two approaches may even
yield second derivatives with different signs.
- 23 -12.To implement the HNR method, we quasi-difference to eliminate serial correlation in
E,,movingthe lagged emissions tenn to the right-hand side:
c.,= I3 (1 —p) + pç ÷(Y — PYA,4) + 132 (Yh — PY1)
+ (t - p1) +f.(1—p) + p.,.





and estimate the resulting equation using instrumental variables to accommodate the
correlation between Esc,,1and4ur.Inour application, we choose as instrumental
variablesandy,, as well as first and second lags of these variables. We then
estimate the parameters of the equation under the null hypothesis that these
instrumental variables are orthogonal to the error term. If GDP and emissions are
simultaneously determined, this will be manifested as a correlation between
contemporaneous and lagged values of Yt Yt and p,,. Similarly, if the correct
specification of the underlying relationship contains additional lagged values of ci,,Y;r'
or Y these also will be correlated with the instrumental variables. The test statistics,
each distributed as a chi-square with 22 degrees of freedom, are 29.6 and 31.4 for the
levels and log specifications, respectively.
13.The idea of convergence is by no means uncontroversial. Baumol [1986] and
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil [1992] argue that the data support convergence. However,
DeLong [1988] critiques the method used by Baumol, while Barro [1991) argues that
the international data used by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil are inconsistent with the
convergence hypothesis. Levine and Renelt [1992] argue that the cross-country
regressions are too sensitive to specification difference to resolve the issue.
14.The inclusion of the quadratic term permits us to accommodate the empirical
significance of "basket case" countries that do not experience rapid growth despite
their very low income per capita.
15.Between 1962 and 1986, the percentage of global emissions contained in the sample
varies within a very narrow range, from 71.7 percent to 73.9 percent, tending to
decline over the period. The one exception is 1973, when the sample only contains
67.7 percent of global emissions. We speculate that this value results from the OPEC
shock. The Eastern bloc nations are relatively under-represented in our sample, yet
they also escaped the main impact of the OPEC price hike.
16.Chine [1992] surveys the literature on fossil fuel supply, concluding that "there should
be at least 7,000 gigatons of carbon (GtC) available from coal at moderate prices, and
14,000 gigatons of carbon available at prices still below levels that hold emissions to
low level? (page 45) (i.e., 80 percent of the 1990 rate). Both numbers are well in
-24-excess of thecumulativeemissions from all sources that we forecast for the next
centuzy.
17.For instance, using all of the year effects produces an upward-sloping trend (with
coefficient estimates that are significantly different from zero). In contrast, if one
believes that there was a change of regime in 1973 and includes only die year effects
starting in that year, the point estimate of the trend is negative, but has wide
confidence intervals and is not significantly different from zero.
18.These minimum and maximum values might be viewed as capturing at least some of
the impact of the oil shocks, insofar as the minimums occur in 1981 (levels model)
and 1974 (logs model), while the maximums occur in 1979 (levels model) and 1978
(logs model). While not exact, this corresponds, with short lags, to oil price peaks in
1973 and 1979.
19.See also Edmonds and Reilly [1983].
20.Quintilès were constructed by ranking the total global population in 1986 by the mean
per capita GDP in the country in which each individual resided. No attempt was made
to readjust quintiles in each year to reflect differences in population growth rates.
-25-TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Per Capita Emissions (c) .944 1.349
(Metric Tons of Carbon)
Per Capita GDP (y) $4,343 4,292
(1986 U.S. Dollars)
Population (n) 33.471 115.495
(Millions)
Number of Countries in Sample 130
Number of Complete Time Series 108
Percentage of Global Fossil Fuel and Cement Emissions
73 7 (net of Gas Flaring) Included in Sample"
Percentageof Total Anthropogeriic CO2 Emissions from All 47.9
Sources Included in the Sample'
Computed for 1985, the last year of the sample for which there is a complete cross section
of countries.
"Avege for the period 195 1-1986.
tComputed for 1987 (Source: World Resources [1991]). Other sources of emissions can




Quadratic Cubic Quadratic Cubic
.31797 .20744 .40682** -.42628
(.18224) (.18319) (.17531) (.17469)
.15212 .21420 .52037" .55078w
(.013671) (.02452) (.05039) (.05057)
12 -.002152" -.00714" -.02895 .115149"
(.00034) (.00167) (.01949) (.03416)
.000085 --- -.05637
(.00002789) (.01099)
.759 .759 .842 .843
OBS 3754 3754 3754 3754
F (f=0) 33.68 33.78 22.58" 21.65"
F (1=0) 2.43'' 2.32' 5.34 5.2P
Significantly different from zero at .01 level.
Significantlydifferent from zero at .05 level.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 1: Actual and Fitted Values for the Four Functional Fomis
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FIGURE 5: Shares of Global CO2 Emissions, by Quintile
A. Quadratic in Levels
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•4Signfficantly different from zero at .01 level.
"Significantly different from zero at .05 level.
'Significantly different from zero at .1 level.
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